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The New Era of Secret Law, 
by Elizabeth (Liza) Goitein
Reviewed by Patrice McDermott
The new era of secret law, New York University School of Law, Brennan 
Center for Justice, 2016 / 106 pp. / 
https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/new-era-secret-law
In a recent Brennan Center report, The New Era of Secret Law, 
Elizabeth (Liza) Goitein articulates, examines and evaluates both the claims 
for and objections to secret law. Under this banner, the report includes “any 
law that is withheld from the public, regardless of whether it may be shared 
among agencies or with certain members or committees of Congress.” 
Goitein’s underlying goal is to propose procedural and substantive reforms.  
Goitein’s history is of central importance to the utility of this work.  
She co-directs the Brennan Center for Justice’s Liberty and National Security 
Program. Before coming to the Brennan Center, Ms. Goitein served as 
counsel to Senator Feingold, Chairman of the Constitution Subcommittee of 
the Senate Judiciary Committee, and as a trial attorney in the Federal 
Programs Branch of the Civil Division of the Department of Justice.1 This 
1  Ms. Goitein is co-author of the Brennan Center’s reports Overseas Surveillance in an 
Interconnected World, What Went Wrong with the FISA Court, and Reducing 
Overclassification Through Accountability, and author of the chapter “Overclassification: 
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background and the relationships she has developed with officials in the 
Intelligence Community inform not only this research, but also her advocacy 
on the issues addressed in it.  This is not only a deeply-informed2, and 
informative, work but it also reflects Goitein’s principled advocacy stances. 
The red cover indicates (according to the Center’s stated color scheme)
that it is a research reports offering in-depth empirical findings.3  These 
include interviews and discussions with Intelligence Community officials and 
also FOIA requests submitted by the Brennan Center that allowed Goitein 
(and her colleagues) to provide background and context.4 
Goitein’s report is intended to answer several critical questions that are
related to a central question: Is Secret law Necessary? Toward answering 
this central inquiry, she asks: what do we mean when we refer to “secret 
Its Causes and Consequences” in the book An Enduring Tension: Balancing National 
Security and Our Access to Information. Her writing also has been featured in major 
newspapers including The New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, USA 
Today, and LA Times, and she is a frequent commentator on MSNBC and NPR. Ms. 
Goitein graduated from the Yale Law School and clerked for the Honorable Michael Daly 
Hawkins on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
2  Goitein’s 469 endnotes cover 37-plus pages.
3 The Brennan Center attempted to discern the amount of secret law in certain categories; 
they relied on a “combination of public documents, interviews and other communications 
with government officials, and records obtained through FOIA. Discussing the “inherent 
limitations of this process and the wild card of “unknown unknowns,”” Goitein states that 
“there is no pretense that the resulting information presents a complete or precise 
picture.” She further notes the obstacles to completeness: “Assembling comprehensive 
statistics regarding the number of published versus unpublished legal pronouncements in 
any given category would require government cooperation, if not participation. 
Nonetheless, even the partial information the Center was able to obtain suggests that 
secret law is more prevalent than many would imagine.” See page 28.
4  See, for example, pages 5, 6, 28, 39, 41, 47, 49, 52, 59, 61.
2
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law;” why secret law is of greater concern than other forms of government 
secrecy that we tolerate and even condone; and how common is security-
driven secret law, and where else is it occurring? A central point is that the 
rise of the national security state which emerged after World War II and 
intensified after 9/11, has resulted for the first time in the systematic and 
deliberate concealment of law.
A key, although certainly not sole,5 focus of Goitein’s report is national 
security law.  She asks, in confronting the various claims for the need for 
secrecy in this area: Are there cases in which disclosure of rules or legal 
interpretations, even with sensitive facts redacted, could harm national 
security? How great is that risk, and how does it compare with the harms of 
secret law?  What procedural and substantive reforms could help ensure that
the public’s interests in both the transparency of laws and the security of the
nation are best served?
It is worth spending a few paragraphs looking at her Section C - 
What’s Wrong with Secret Law? as many of the arguments that Goitein puts 
forward throughout her examination of the why nots for secret law are 
central to her analyses and to the reforms she proposes. The problems with 
secret law are broken down into philosophical objections, constitutional 
concerns, and practical harms.  Under the first category, she cites 
5  Goitein’s Table of Contents serves as a useful and detailed outline of the scope and 
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philosophers who have variously argued that publicity or public promulgation
is what gives law its moral legitimacy and authority. She quotes legal 
theorist Lon Fuller in points that re-appear throughout the report:
The laws should . . . be given adequate publication so that they may
be subject to public criticism, including the criticism that they are 
the kind of laws that ought not to be enacted unless their content 
can be effectively conveyed to those subject to them. It is also plain
that if the laws are not made readily available, there is no check 
against a disregard of them by those charged with their application 
and enforcement.1 
As Goitein notes, a non-public regulation is an autocratic whim and the
concept of a non-public regulation has particular force in democracies, where
the legitimacy of the law stems from the open democratic process that 
generates it. Moreover, the secrecy of a law undermines not only the law’s 
legitimacy, but also that of the lawmaker. She quotes the words of one 
scholar: “[S]ecret law deprives the governor of his legitimacy, undermining 
his right to rule.”2 
In regard to constitutional concerns, she notes that the U.S. 
Constitution includes surprisingly few express references — only two — to 
openness or secrecy. Both references pertain to Congress. In essence, the 
Constitution states that the proceedings of Congress generally must be 
public, and its appropriations always must be public. Beyond this, the 
Constitution contains no express commands to divulge — or powers to 
conceal.  As Goitein notes, however, many of our most cherished rights, and 
4
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some of the government’s most important authorities, are not explicit in the 
Constitution’s text. Courts, rather, have inferred them from ambiguous 
language or derived them from the structure or purpose of various 
provisions.3, 4The result to date, she notes, is that the constitutional right of 
access to government information is a narrow one that applies almost 
exclusively to court proceedings. Although there are Court indictments of 
“secret law,” Goitein notes5 that they have been in the context of FOIA 
cases, not constitutional challenges. Goitein nevertheless, identifies strong 
arguments for why secret law violates the Constitution.  
In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,6 Chief Justice Warren Burger 
opined that “[t]he First Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and 
the self-expression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the 
stock of information from which members of the public may draw.” In his 
concurrence, Justice William Brennan, Jr. expounded on this idea, observing 
that “the First Amendment embodies more than a commitment to free 
expression and communicative interchange for their own sakes; it has a 
structural role to play in securing and fostering our republican system of self-
government.” For this reason, it “entails solicitude not only for 
communication itself; but also for the indispensable conditions of meaningful 
communication,” including access to government information. 
In his opinion, Justice Brennan articulated a two-part test, later 
adopted7 by the Supreme Court majority, for determining when the First 
5
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Amendment supplies a right of access: courts should inquire whether there is
“an enduring and vital tradition of public entrée to particular proceedings or 
information;” courts should ask “whether access to a particular government 
process is important in terms of that very process.”8 Together, these are 
known as the “experience and logic” test.
Goitein notes, though, that courts have struggled to determine 
whether — or how — the two-part test applies outside the courtroom. As the
administrative state9 is a somewhat recent (historically speaking) 
development, the “experience” prong becomes problematic in the context of 
agency adjudications.10 Lower courts are split over whether the right of 
access extends beyond the courts,11 and the Supreme Court has offered no 
guidance or clarification. Many courts and scholars have taken the Court’s 
long silence as suggesting that the right of access to judicial proceedings is 
the exception, and that “[d]isclosure of government information generally is 
left to the political forces that govern a democratic republic.”12 
In this discussion, Goitein expounds an argument that is central to her 
view of secret law in a democracy: 
The rationale underlying the First Amendment right of access to 
judicial proceedings — i.e., that access helps “ensure that the 
individual citizen can effectively participate in and contribute to our 
republican system of self-government”13 ... would clearly support a 
First Amendment right of access to government pronouncements 
having the force of law. 
6
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Additionally, Goitein argues that, reading several provisions of the 
Constitution together — including the First Amendment, the enumeration of 
powers, the election provisions, and the Guarantee clause — one might posit
a broad public right to information about all kinds of government activity, as 
secrecy “risk[s] subverting the Constitution’s unifying aim to create a 
government of laws that would also be controlled by and responsive to the 
people.”14 
The “harms” concern is at the heart of Goitein’s project. She regularly 
returns to the practical ways in which secret law subverts the rule of law. On
one front, when people are not aware of the rules their government must 
follow,
 They cannot hold the government accountable for violations of those 
rules or otherwise assert their own legal rights against the 
government15 ;
 Indeed, they cannot even protest the abrogation of their rights16; 
 It allows the government to develop unfair laws or to apply them an 
unfair manner, safe in the knowledge that there will be no 
repercussions17;
 Government actors are, of course, aware of this de facto immunity. 
Another harm resulting from secrecy is the creation and perpetuation 
of bad law:
 Secrecy inhibits the process by which law is made and refined — a 
process that begins with public participation. The legislative process 
7
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affords ample opportunity for stakeholders to express their views. 
 Secrecy – and lack of public participation – inhibits the development of
better–informed regulations. Congress passed the APA to require (at a 
minimum) public notice and comment. The purpose was not to pay 
deference to a theoretical public right. Rather, Congress believed that 
input from the public — including experts outside of government and 
people directly affected by the proposed measures — leads to better-
informed lawmaking and, thus, better laws.18  
From another perspective, when laws are made without public 
involvement — particularly when they are made by small groups of 
government officials acting in secret — the result can be the entrenchment 
of existing institutional norms, biases, and even mistakes.19 
From my perspective, her analysis of the Bush-Cheney Administration’s
subversions and evasions of law in the area of foreign intelligence 
surveillance encapsulates the effects of secrecy and secret law on the ability 
of the public – and much of Congress – to hold government accountable.  As 
Goitein makes clear, it was not only the Executive that escaped publicity and
accountability, but also the courts and the oversight committees in Congress.
The follow-on to the Snowden disclosures6 demonstrated vividly how far the 
U.S. government had gone down a path of deeply secret law the purpose of 
which was to circumvent statutory and constitutional limits on the 
surveillance of U.S. persons. This path is a clear example of Daniel P. 
Moynihan’s insights about a parallel regulatory regime:
6  I am using this terminology although it is important to note that Snowden himself did 
not make any disclosures; he made the information available to journalists who chose, 
with their editors, what to disclose.
8
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...”overregulation" is a continuing theme in American public life, as in 
most modern administrative states. Secrecy would be such an issue, 
save that secrecy is secret. Make no mistake, however. It is a parallel 
regulatory regime with a far greater potential for damage if it 
malfunctions.20 
Goitein first discusses the Bush administration’s initiatives to develop 
legal interpretations on torture and warrantless surveillance programs in her 
discussion of the harms of secret law: 
...the risk of developing ill-considered legal interpretations that reflect 
institutional bias or “groupthink” is greater when only a handful of 
executive officials are involved in formulating them. The opportunity to
correct such mistakes disappears when the law itself is kept within this
small group. Such close holds also prevent the other branches of 
government from exercising their constitutional function of providing 
checks and balances.7 
Indeed, the administration came under criticism for relying on a small 
cadre of like-minded officials. Time after time, “[t]he policymaking process 
was...rigged to block informational pathways that could have subjected deep
secrets to additional forms of scrutiny and revision.”21 In one famous 
example, cited by Jack Goldsmith (who led the Justice Department’s Office of
Legal Counsel under President Bush), the Department of Justice refused to 
share its legal justification for the NSA’s warrantless surveillance programs 
with the NSA’s General Counsel.22 
While it is often argued that disclosures were made to congressional 
oversight committees, Goitein notes that these raise the question of how 
7   See page 10.
9
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effective secret legislative oversight can be. The calculus of congressional 
accountability (and that of individual members) changes when oversight 
happens behind closed doors. Goldsmith has noted that intelligence 
committees have little incentive to pick secret battles with the executive 
branch on national security issues: there are no political rewards to these 
fights — no victories to splash across constituent newsletters, no legislative 
favors to dole out to donors, but there are political risks: if a terrorist attack 
were to occur, any actions members had taken to limit the executive 
branch’s exercise of national security authorities surely would come to 
light.23 
To the question whether secret law is inevitable – particularly when 
legal opinions are (or are claimed to be) intermingled with legitimately secret
operational details (“the entanglement of legal analysis with classified fact”), 
Goitein responds that after several FISA Court opinions were made public by 
Snowden and (in response) by the Director of National Intelligence, that 
court began writing at least some of its opinions with an eye toward public 
disclosure — a practice that will likely become standard now that the USA 
Freedom Act requires the release of a redacted or summarized version of all 
significant FISA Court opinions. 
Goitein also addresses the claim that the efficacy of surveillance 
programs depends on concealing, not just the identities of particular targets,
10
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but the programs’ very existence.8 This was the claim behind the secrecy of 
President Bush’s warrantless wiretapping program. When the general 
framework of this program was made public through leaks, however, Goitein 
notes that the executive branch did not abandon it on the ground that its 
efficacy had been compromised. Instead, the administration pushed to have 
the program continued under public laws. Congress obliged, codifying the 
program in Section 702 of FISA, and executive officials continue to tout its 
effectiveness.24 Similarly, the bulk collection of Americans’ phone records, 
which was kept secret allegedly to preserve its utility, was replaced with a 
narrower program designed to accomplish the same end.  As she points out, 
the rules for the new program are contained in public law, yet their publicity 
did not affect the administration’s assessment that the program would 
provide the intelligence establishment with the tools it needs.25
Due to the constraints of length, I am regretfully relegating Goitein’s 
reform recommendations to a footnote.9  This is not to imply they do not 
8  See page 25.
9  The report recommends six reforms that could rein in secret law across all three 
branches: 1) Decisions to withhold legal rules and authoritative legal interpretations from 
the public should be made by an inter-agency body of senior officials; 2) The standard for
keeping law secret should be more stringent than the current standard for classifying 
information. Legal rules and authoritative legal interpretations should be withheld only if 
it is highly likely that their disclosure would result, either directly or indirectly, in loss of 
life, serious bodily harm, or significant economic or property damage; 3) Certain 
categories of law should never be secret. The disclosure of pure legal analysis, containing 
no sensitive facts, cannot harm national security. Legal interpretations that purport to 
exempt the executive branch from compliance with statutes or that stretch statutory 
terms beyond their ordinary meanings also should not be secret; 4) When the executive 
branch issues secret law, it should immediately share the law with the other branches 
and with independent oversight bodies; 5)Indefinite secret law is constitutionally 
11
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merit attention and discussion; they are, after all, the policy arguments to 
which her report builds.  I hope, though, that - with limited space - the 
review above of a small portion of the assessments and analyses on which 
she builds her case will entice the reader to turn to Goitein’s admirable 
report (and to turn students and colleagues to it). It is, in essence, a deeply-
researched and highly valuable policy brief with an aim of making specific 
policy recommendations.  And readable to boot.
intolerable. There should be a four-year time limit on the secrecy of legal rules and 
authoritative legal interpretations. Renewals should require the unanimous approval of 
the inter-agency body charged with making secrecy determinations. Two renewals should
be permitted, creating an effective 12-year ceiling on the secrecy of laws; 6) Americans 
should know how much secret law exists and the general areas where it is being applied. 
Each government body producing secret law should be required to make public an index 
that lists all of the secret rules and interpretations by date, general subject matter, and 
any other information that can be made available.
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